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This opinion paper discusses the impor-
tance of augmentation in general and
brain augmentation in particular, and con-
siders the merits of some arguments that
have been made against it. Augmentations
are technologies created in order to
improve upon human capabilities and
characteristics. Such technologies have had
a profound effect on our species, and their
omnipresence might be said to distinguish
us apart from every other species more-
so than anything aside from our DNA.
Augmentations are so essential to us, so
widespread, that we often forget that they
are artificial, and not truly a part of us.
Indeed, if all augmentations were lost to
us and could not be replaced, without any
viable means to feed and protect ourselves,
most humans would be dead in very a
short time.
The need for augmentation is related
in part to our poor biological adapta-
tions for survival. We are born with-
out claws, fur, and other characteristics
that most animals require. What evolu-
tion has endowed us with instead is a
large and complex nervous system. Our
brains are metabolically expensive, requir-
ing over 20% of our metabolism, while
representing only 2% of our body mass
(Kety, 1957; Sokoloff, 1960; Rolfe and
Brown, 1997). Large brains are also diffi-
cult to grow, causing potential problems
in childbirth as the baby’s head must pass
through the birth canal, and a long child-
hood is required to learn the minimum
needed for survival and to become a mem-
ber of society. However, they provide us
with the means to compensate for our
physical limitations. We can imagine, cre-
ate, and manufacture a variety of aug-
mentations. Housing and clothing for pro-
tection, agriculture for food, transporta-
tion, medicine, and many others. Such
physical augmentations have provided us
with a means to expand our livable envi-
ronment to include most of the planet,
including underwater and outer space, and
they satisfy our biological and emotional
needs far beyond what would otherwise be
possible.
Augmentative technologies include not
only physical but also cognitive enhance-
ments. Similar to physical enhancements,
cognitive enhancements provide us with
capabilities beyond that provided by
our nervous systems, to maintain or
expand our perceptual, cognitive, and
affective capabilities. This includes such
devices as telescopes, microscopes, hear-
ing aids, television, the internet, and
myriad other devices that expand our
senses and allow us to perceive much
more than our immediate environment.
Cognitive enhancements also include
writing and mathematics, which have
provided tremendous benefits, matched
only by the potential of the computer age,
which has transformed our world in just
a few decades, and is likely to continue
to do so.
Learning how to use any augmenta-
tion leads to adaptive changes in the
nervous system as new memories are
encoded and procedures are automated.
By contrast, neuroenhancement changes
the nervous system directly, augmenting
cognition, and behavior from the inside
out. Current forms of neuroenhancement
include psychoactive substances, biofeed-
back, cognitive training, methods that pro-
mote physical health such as nutrition
and exercise, mindfulness, electromag-
netic methods of neurostimulation such as
deep brain stimulation (DBS), transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and
others reviewed in Clark and Parasuraman
(2014), and methods using ultrasound
or near-infrared light. Indeed, neuroen-
hancement is not just “one thing” any
more then exercise or learning is one thing,
but instead covers a large and expanding
array of different technologies.
Recent work in neuroenhancement has
produced some surprising results. Work in
our laboratory has shown that tDCS, a rel-
atively simple technique that uses a 9-volt
battery to produce a 1–2mA current, led
to large improvements in learning of a dif-
ficult visual perceptual task. Performance
and d’ (a measure of signal discriminabil-
ity) were found to double while the false
alarm rate was halved (Clark et al., 2012;
Coffman et al., 2012b). This showed a
dose-response effect (Clark et al., 2012),
lasted for over 24 h (Falcone et al., 2012),
and was not related to stimulation arti-
fact or the type of experimental blinding
used (Coffman et al., 2012b). TDCS also
alters neurochemistry (Clark et al., 2011)
and increases some forms of attention
(Coffman et al., 2012a), which together
and along with other effects may result
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in these large improvements in behavior.
Other laboratories have found that tDCS
can be used to increase working memory,
explicit and implicit memory, perception
and attention (reviewed in Coffman et al.,
2014), with an average increase in effect
size of about 0.9 between active and sham
across studies. Using different methods of
stimulation, these forms of cognition can
also be reduced.
It should be clear to the reader
by now that augmentation is essen-
tial to human existence, that physical-,
cognitive-, and neuro-enhancement are
all important to us, and that continued
development of neuroenhancement tech-
nologies may lead to even more use-
ful forms of brain augmentation. While
there is some debate about its ultimate
utility (Walsh, 2013), most evidence sug-
gests that with further development, these
many forms of neuroenhancement will
likely lead to at least a few useful applica-
tions, and perhaps many. However, recent
advances in neuroenhancement have also
led to claims that some types are too
unusual, immoral or unethical and should
be banned or heavily managed. These
arguments take a number of different
forms. I will next discuss a subset of
these.
(1) Cognitive augmentations may provide
benefits only to those few who can
afford them, thus further widening
the social and cultural gap created
by income differences (discussed in
Hyman, 2011).
Different technologies for cognitive aug-
mentation vary greatly in their relative
cost. DBS can indeed be very costly,
requiring neurosurgery to implant a care-
fully manufactured devise. However, other
methods such as tDCS are relatively inex-
pensive, using technology that is already
widely available for other purposes, elec-
trodes made of inexpensive materials, and
a single 9-volt battery that can operate the
device for hours. So, while some meth-
ods of neuroenhancement may be too
expensive for many people, other meth-
ods exist that aremore affordable. I suggest
here that simpler, cheaper and safer meth-
ods of neuroenhancement, and indeed all
medical technologies, should be developed
and attempted for treatment first, and
only when these are proven to be inade-
quate should more expensive and poten-
tially dangerous methods be attempted.
This would lead to the most cost effective,
safe, and beneficial treatments becom-
ing more widely available, while reduc-
ing the potential harm of treatment side-
effects.
(2) Cognitive augmentation might lead to
an enhancement “arms race,” where
all people are required to use enhance-
ment in order to stay competitive
(summarized in Hyman, 2011).
This concern may have some basis in
fact. If we look at other forms of aug-
mentation, those that are most useful are
often adapted by the majority of peo-
ple, to the detriment of those few who
do not or cannot. Literacy provides an
excellent example of this. Historically,
literacy was limited to just a few, help-
ing to maintain the sociopolitical struc-
ture, with those on top using literacy
to maintain control. Once literacy was
more widely disseminated, it helped to
promote democracy and social change.
Today, those who are illiterate are often
relegated to lower-paying jobs, welfare,
or crime to survive. Indeed, since lit-
eracy is so beneficial, it is most often
caused by poor circumstances, rather than
a personal choice. Might it be argued
the literacy is unfair because it relegates
most involuntary illiterates to the low-
est levels of society, and therefore should
be denied to all? If a form of brain-
augmentation turned out to be as ben-
eficial as literacy, would it be equally
unreasonable to deny it to all in order
to respect the choices of a few? I argue
here that, as with literacy, mathematics,
computer proficiency, and many other
examples, an entire society should not be
put at a disadvantage to appease those
few who cannot or choose not to use
an augmentation. Should there be addi-
tional costs in terms of safety or other
issues, this becomes more complicated,
and needs to be dealt with by weigh-
ing factual evidence carefully in terms
of costs vs. benefits, and our commonly
accepted sense of ethics. In order to do this
adequately, published studies of neuroen-
hancement must use carefully controlled
and replicable methods, provide statistics,
and openly describeside effects and failures
so that both costs and benefits can be well
understood.
(3) Enhancements in one cognitive
domain may lead to reductions in
other domains (Brem et al., 2014).
This argument assumes that emphasizing
one form of cognition must necessar-
ily reduce others to maintain the total
amount of cognitive function. While there
is some evidence that decrements in one
form of cognition can lead to enhance-
ments in others (Luber and Lisanby,
2014), this hypothesis leads to a number
of questions. For instance, is enhancement
necessarily an increase in a specific cog-
nitive “volume,” or instead might other
mechanisms be involved, such as reduc-
ing neural “noise,” leading to increased
neural SNR but without adding to cogni-
tive load? Also, is total cognition stagnant,
or does it vary over time? There is sub-
stantial evidence that it does, such as
from birth to adulthood, and depend-
ing on state factors such as alertness,
amount of sleep, nutrition, exercise, train-
ing and so on, and so enhancements
that affect these may increase cognitive
“volume” without reductions in other
areas. Finally, if reductions are indeed
found in other cognitive domains, the
question arises of how important those
domains are relative to those that are
enhanced. In all cases, it’s important to
obtain reliable empirical data, and per-
form cost-benefit analyses before making
firm decisions on whether cognitive- and
brain-augmentations should be used.
(4) Uncertainty regarding safety is also an
issue.
Potential dangers are present for all forms
of brain augmentation, but the ques-
tions that should be asked are, “Is it as
safe or safer than other methods cur-
rently in use?” and “Do the benefits out-
weigh the costs?” For some forms of neu-
roenhancement, their use might possibly
cause harm. As an example, DBS pro-
duces damage during implantation, and
can lead to bleeding, infection, and other
issues that have resulted in the deaths
of some patients (Rocha et al., 2014).
However, most methods of neuroen-
hancement are unlikely to cause physical
harm if used correctly. The use of any
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medical augmentation should be based
on published clinical trials when available,
using methods approved by IRBs or other
governing bodies. There are some impor-
tant differences between pharmaceuticals
and tDCS that suggest tDCS should be
safer. TDCS can be ended in a few seconds,
compared with a “wash out” period of days
or weeks for some pharmaceuticals. TDCS
can be directed to specific points on the
head, while avoiding other organs such as
liver, heart and kidneys, where deleterious
side effects of pharmaceuticals can some-
times occur. Also the chance of forming
unexpected chemical side products from
interactions with other concurrent treat-
ments is reduced. Overall, tDCS has far
fewer and less dangerous side effects, lim-
ited to redness/irritation under the elec-
trodes, mild tingling, itching, heat and less
commonly fatigue, transient headaches,
nausea, and insomnia (Poreisz et al.,
2007). Furthermore, brain stimulation for
pain treatment is much less likely to
lead to addiction when compared with
opiates. Based on these qualities, tDCS
appears safer than pharmaceuticals for
most applications. Once effective meth-
ods of brain stimulation for clinical treat-
ment are developed in smaller studies,
large scale clinical trials need to be per-
formed in order to better understand their
costs and benefits relative to the current
standard of care. As an example, TDCS
shows great potential for the treatment
of a variety of illnesses, but few large-
scale clinical trials have been performed
thus far.
(5) A broader argument involves the
potential risks imposed by our
increasing dependence on modern
technologies that might have unfore-
seen negative effects, resulting in our
ultimate demise (Rees, 2003).
While the combined side effects of
our technological world, such as pollu-
tion, population expansion, diminishing
resources, and continued warfare may end
our domination of Earth as soon as it
began, at present we are at our peak in
many ways. The possibility that an other-
wise safe augmentative technology might
lead to our demise is impossible to pre-
dict. We cannot see into the future, but
we can look for patterns that may help
us to estimate the likelihood of future
events. Some technologies, such as land-
mines and nuclear weapons, can be argued
to produce much more harm than good
and should be banned. However, nearly
anything can be used with the inten-
tion of doing harm. From sharpened
rocks to rockets, from ancient writing
to modern computers, even the wheel,
nearly all technologies have been used
to support warfare or to cause harm in
some way. By contrast, cognitive- and
brain-augmentation technologies have
provided many benefits to us thus far,
and will likely continue to do so. Our
success has a species has primarily been
derived through our intelligence and cog-
nitive capabilities. Enhancing these further
through the benefits of cognitive- and
brain-augmentation, we might one day
develop better, safer and more sustainable
technologies to reduce pollution, better
manage resources, reduce the need for or
find alternatives to warfare, and improve
our chances of survival overall, rather than
reducing them.
SUMMARY
We can say with certainty that our species
would be unlikely to exist as it does
today without augmentation. Cognitive-
and neuroenhancements are just the latest
in a long line of augmentations that have
helped our species to survive and flour-
ish. While there are some valid concerns,
the benefits of brain augmentations like
tDCS will likely far outweigh their costs
when properly used. The continued pur-
suit of cognitive- and neuro-enhancement
will help us to improve our quality of life,
reduce suffering from brain andmental ill-
ness, and enhance our chances of survival
long-term.
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